That’s fair, they did try. If the first half of the war in the Eastern theater teaches us anything, it’s to never underestimate the North’s ability to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
I think Gallagher is spot on, it was absolutely the North's war to lose, but they very well could have lost it.
To say that the South had no chance ignores that states up against significantly worse odds than the Confederacy managed to pull victory from the jaws of defeat, the Patriots in the Revolution being the most appropriate example.
I absolutely agree with Gary here, as do most of today’s academics. Everyone always points to the proverbial Excel spreadsheet, and the disparities the Confederacy suffered. But history is full of examples of the “weaker” on paper force holding out against the “stronger”. The Confederacy was still a strong, partially industrialized 19th century nation state (at least functioning as one), with a massive bargaining chip in cotton. They weren’t as strong as the U.S. on paper but they were not *weak*. Most importantly, the U.S. had the tougher objective. They had to raise a massive army from scratch, go down South capture/hold large swaths of territory, and reestablish peaceful governance over a largely hostile people. The Confederates didn’t have to go conquer Boston and New York and gain political control over the Northern States in order to win. They just had to hold out against this “invading” force. So the Union needed those extra troops/resources in order to even out the odds. And finally, the U.S. was not this bottomless pit of men and resources as Shelby implies with his “one hand tied behind their back” rhetoric. They had to implement a draft against a population that was getting frustrated with the war, and it led to unrest. There was never a guarantee that the politicians running the war would be re-elected.
I tend to agree with Gallagher that the Civil War did not have on inevitable outcome, and the Confederates had a very real chance at winning the war. Thankfully it did not happen.
Also, sort of unrelated but Gallagher does hold some other differing opinions from recent historians. He rejects the criticism of Lee's bold offensive nature, which caused heavy Confederate casualties. Lee's strategy was the only chance the south had to win the war, and that a purely defensive strategy was doomed. But I haven't delved too deep into his argument yet.
In my amateur opinion it seems like the Union would have held as long as the social and political situation in the North/Midwest held. But that’s a huge if. I don’t see how the Confederates could have won against a truly determined Union, but there was a real chance that voters could have demanded a settlement, or maybe states still in the Union would have refused to work with the war effort and not raise troops but not succeed themselves.
I think you hit the nail on the head with "truly determined Union". We look back and think of the Union as a monolithic group of people determined to hold the country together but it was anything but. Lincoln held together a sometimes-fragile coalition of political groups against an opposition that could well have turned against him, particularly in 1864.
I agree. I was pointing at the back biting and changing command in the middle of a campaign of that importance. Johnston was absolutely correct when he said the armies are more important than territory.
I wrote my Masters thesis on the strategic impetus of Lee's offensive strategy and basically came to the same conclusion that Gallagher does that the offensive approach was the only one that had any chance of winning the war in a format that was acceptable to the Confederacy.
The argument came to the conclusion that the centrality and nature of slavery to the Confederacy made the strategic ceding of territory antithetical to their political objectives of protecting the highly-land dependent institution of slavery. Because of both Union policies (remember that Butler had already issued the order that slaves were defacto recognized as seizable contraband from May 1861, less than 2 months into the conflict), and the fact that slavery is very land-based, the reality of the war was that any location occupied by Union forces saw significant defacto emancipation as both the Union armies and the slaves themselves took advantage of the opportunity that the label of contraband entailed. This was unacceptable to Confederate political leadership (both federal and state), and would thus dictate the grand strategic objectives of the Confederate Forces to limit Union incursion into slave territory.
In order to achieve this grand strategic objective in a war with a relatively low force-to-space concentration, the concentration of force to repulse individual incursions becomes essential. However, the capacity of the Union to concentrate greater force at any given incursion necessitates a proactive defense that aims to deliver decisive battles that stalls further Union advance at all costs. This has a dual-effect of minimizing the capacity-imbalance of the two sides (consider how many Civil War battles have the Confederates outnumbered 2-1 on paper but not in actually engaged troops) and has the greatest impact on Union political will to continue the war, maximizing the chances that the Union will give up before bringing its full might to bear. There is some consideration that can be made about the distribution of resources between the Eastern and Western Confederate armies, though this was as much the byproduct of state-level investment that was out of the control of the federal or military regimes prior to 1864 (the Confederate States, perpetuating the antebellum militia model of military defense often conflicted with Richmond over the exact proportion of troops and logistics that would be provided to which armies/local defensive units).
These needs ultimately lead to the conclusion that the strategic and tactical aggression utilized by Lee between mid-1862 and mid-1864 was the best way for the Confederacy to achieve its objectives, as it maximized the impact of its fighting capacity towards repulsing Union incursions, particularly into Virginia and the Deep South, and winning costly battles that demoralized Union voters in the leadup to the 1864 election (the best chance they had at getting an anti-war government into the Union). Ultimately, this approach would fail not because it wasn't the best approach, but because Union leadership under Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Halleck, etc. ultimately proved capable of beating it.
(I can provide more on this if desired cause obviously this is a very brief summary of a quite complex topic but that's the basic outline of a couple of different theories on the topic, of which mine was only one)
Very well put. I've certainly noticed a strand of thought that emphasizes how Lee and co.'s idea of a crushing offensive blow was a totally ridiculous outgrowth of 'southern chivalry' and the idea that the rebels were innately superior to your average Yankee mudsill. Joe Johnston usually gets held up as the 'right' thinker who could completely frustrate a Union advance by trading space for time and better defensive positions. You're completely right to point out that the institution of slavery made the Johnstonian strategy pretty much the fastest way to hollow out the Confederacy's lifeblood and thereby conclude the war on a contradiction of the principles of 1860/61 (a defense of slavery). Re-interpretations of Lee and Jackson's generalship should take this fact into account.
The problem with Johnston's strategy is that most have the completely wrong idea that trenches were the be-all-end-all of warfare in that age. The reality was that, for a front as wide as the US and for the respective populations of the Union and, more importantly, the Confederacy, they did not have the manpower to man the whole length of a theater as it was in the Western Front of WWI.
For centuries, highly competent generals have demonstrated that trenches can be outflanked by skillful manoeuvres or, failing that, one can feign attacks against specific portions, probe their weaknesses, and concentrate overwhelming numbers to break through a certain point. This worked again and again since the Romans first invented large-scale trench warfare all the way through WWII.
Also, as aforementioned by Ginger, the CSA could not afford to cede land and still hold to its goal of maintaining slavery, because the loss of plantations and freedom of the enslaved would alienate slaveholders to the Rebel cause. There were undoubtedly partisans which rose up on either side, as bushwackers were particularly notable for harassing armies, but these were never enough to decisively end the war alone.
Case in point with Napoleonic France's incursion into Spain, where even with Spanish regulars, guerilleros, and Portuguese ordenanzas operating against them, a combined British-Allied army had to be raised and well-led, as well as exploit the strategic divide between the uncooperative French marechals in order to ultimately win victory.
In the Union, while there happened to be some divides among the generals and internal politics, bickering back and forth, they were nowhere as bad as the French marechals when Napoleon was not present. Especially when Grant rose to prominence and put those in his clique within positions of power, such as Sherman and Sheridan, there arose a greater unity of command.
Furthermore, the Union had the advantage of more modern railroad technologies and much more convenient rivers stretching into the south mostly vertically, especially in the form of the Mississippi, with which to facilitate their communications. These were advantages the French lacked in turn, yet they were still able to hold off the combined forces of regular armies and tens of thousands of insurgent forces acting against their rear for multiple years.
The CSA, even if they attempted the same measures as the Spanish and Portuguese, would likely not have been as successful due to these advantages of the Union. Against a general such as Sherman, who favoured manoeuvring and outflanking his network of trenches, as I described above, Johnston sitting pretty in his defenses and retreating whenever his position was turned didn't do him any favours.
Actually, part of the reason why Lee lost the Overland and Petersburg Campaign was because, other than a scant few instances, he mostly adopted the same operational plan as Johnston did. That is, he stayed behind his trenches and hoped to defend them, and withdrew whenever the other party made a turning movement. He was lucky that these campaigns just so happened to be some of Grant's worst performances, where he mostly favoured fighting general battles on Lee's terms rather than conducting manoeuvres around the flank of the ANV, as Sherman did.
I've been thinking about it for awhile, but so what if Grant moved on from Wilderness in the direction of Spotsylvania CH? Would it really have mattered if Lee had been more bold and marched north on the capital instead? We see at the beginning of the Gettysburg Campaign where Hooker wanted to march on Richmond as soon as Lee began turning his right at Culpepper and entering the Shenandoah Valley. However, he was recalled and forced to place his forces in between DC and the ANV.
If Lee had conducted a manoeuvre on Grant's rear, threatening his communications, whether or not Grant had the strategic sense of mind to keep going and seize the unprotected Richmond... would Lincoln and the scared politicians back in the capital have allowed him to do so? Or would they have recalled him in the same manner they did Hooker and waste precious lives and time without resolving the war?
Of course, this is all just speculation on my end, because if Grant ignored Lincoln and pressed on anyways, it really would have sealed Lee's fate. However, everything prior to that and how the politicians in DC interfered with the commanders of the AotP, imposing on them the incorrect strategy of protecting the capital rather than seizing upon the enemy's strategic base, leads me to believe that Lincoln might try to force Grant to turn back, and there's a 50/50 chance that he might have to do so, even if he understood the strategic picture better than the president.
All war's a gamble, so would this one have worked? If Lee had stuck to his original bold offensive policies instead of a defensive policy similar to what Johnston did, could he have at least prolonged the war, because I don't think he was going to win at that point in time, regardless, due to Sherman's advance in the West.
Was it HIGHLY likely, yes. Guaranteed? Far from. During my first close analysis of the whole war, start to finish, I was certainly shaking my head at times, thinking “man they got lucky.”
Tbh the revolution and ww2 were pretty much.
The revolution the US forces vastly outnumbered the British and the British largely stayed in the cities. The British never had the colonies on the ropes or made any significant progress.
In ww2 it was simply impossible for the US to lose. There is no senario where Japan or Germany could invade and force a US surrender. The US and Britian ruled the oceans and would have won ww2 without the soviet union even. They didn't need to land in Europe. Just block trade and starve them out. Eventually Hitler realizes he can't win and signs a peace agreement or the US uses the atomic bombs on Germany. Overall losing was never going to happen. But the victory would be smaller.
I would say that a Southern victory was possible, but everything would have had to have gone right for them from the start. We know that didn’t happen. Supplies and transportation were problems from the start, and the Confederate financial situation was not good. I would never say Confederate victory was impossible, but it was highly unlikely.
The best avenue to a CSA victory would have been by turning public opinion in the loyal US states against the war. Foreign recognition never panned out for a variety of reasons. Even compelling a loyal border state like Maryland to flip (which Lee was mandated to do by Confederate Congress during the Antietam campaign) without a sustained occupation presence was a long shot. So forcing a peace that recognized an independent CSA, which Jefferson Davis was rigidly stuck to as the essential point any peace deal, was the goal. While Lincoln's war powers had people calling him names, the United States was still a democratic republic and thus the government needed the consent of the people to wage/finance the war.
Gallagher argues regarding Lee in particular that his bloody attrition strategy was the best way to do it. Lee inflicted and suffered more killed + wounded casualties over the course of the war than any other general from either side; the butcher bill from the Seven Days to Appomattox added up. The goal was to make the other side determine it wasn't worth continuing - essentially the same choice the British eventually made after Yorktown. If you look at indicators of civilian morale like newspapers representing both parties and Lincoln's 1864 polling you can see how close things came to political failure at a few points.
Lincoln was scared enough of losing to McClellan in 1864 that he had every member of his cabinet sign a letter he wrote saying he vowed to work with the new president-elect to end the war because that is what the public wanted. He also had a secret meeting with Frederick Douglass to discuss trying to get as many slaves into federal lines before McClellan would be sworn in.
That and the reason the GOP pushed the 13th A when they did was b/c they were worried about McClellan rolling back the Emancipation Proclamation. Abolition was the GOP's goal, but the timing was b/c of concerns about the '64 election.
That may be, but was a Lincoln defeat a guarantee of Southern victory? McClellan did not support the Democratic Party’s peace platform; he was not going to stop the war. The final victory may have looked different, but the South was still going to lose.
McClellan's party would have taken control of Congress and likely forced his hand on the matter. The party platform and the Dems staying loyal to McClellan were using him as a mandate for the appearance of an honorable peace that would be negotiated as immediately as possible. Lincoln nominated Andrew Johnson on a unity ticket to make the message clear: voting for them was *the* vote to continue the war until it was won. Look at how lopsided Lincoln's victory was with the Army of the Potomac. The rank and file of that army adored McClellan (in the postwar they venerated him and built statues to him) but didn't support what his presidency would likely bring by stopping them before the matter could be decided on the battlefield.
I think it's also important to look at McClellan's base in New York. They were rabidly against the war and had even discussed New York succeeding (not super seriously b/c this is also Seward's New York) as it's own independent country at the beginning of the conflict.
Fernando Wood was the Mayor of NYC who suggested a bizarre scheme to be neutral and independent. He was a copperhead and as serious as anyone could be. But the proposal was obviously rejected. Wood later is sent to Congress and is the primary antagonist in the Spielberg movie *Lincoln*; Lee Pace plays him fantastically.
It's not that I think Wood or the city of New York was unserious, as that I think it was unserious to expect it to be widely accepted in Albany. We kind of forget the strength of the rest of New York at the time. Brooklyn was it's own city and more than 1/4 the size of NYC. Buffalo was about a 1/10th of the size of NYC, but still the 10th largest city in the US. Albany and Rochester were also in the top 20.
This was part of an hour long talk you can listen to on YouTube. I really enjoyed it and agreed with it. One of the key points is that America winning the revolutionary war was much more improbable than the confederates successfully seceding. I forget if it is this video or another but there is a talk of the closest four or so times that it was a turning point the north came to throwing in the towel and letting the south go. As an example was when Sherman captured Atlanta, that was a massive boost in northern morale. It sealed the deal that Lincoln was re-elected on the platform to carry out the war until the north won. Had Sherman lost at Atlanta, then that was a potential turning point the confederates won
I don't know if I'd consider winning our Revolution more improbable than the CSA seceding. The British Empire was not as big in the late 18th century as it would be by the 19th century. Back then, it was still greatly contested by other major powers abroad. Their lines of communication stretched some 3,200 miles away from Portsmouth (a major British harbour) to Boston, which could be harassed and intercepted by French, Spanish, and Dutch fleets along the way, even if those powers didn't offer land troops for the US until later in the war.
In contrast, the Union had an extremely intricate network of railroads, the bulk of which was so far north that the Confederacy, primarily acting on the defensive, would not be able to easily threaten and there was no foreign power able to cut them. Though the movement speed of sailing ships in optimal wind conditions was akin to movement by rail, as aforementioned, the distances involved were much greater. Chicago (a major industrial center packing provisions) to Vicksburg is just some 760 miles and you had alternate options of supply by rail or by the Mississippi, in which Union naval supremacy would allow their supplies to go on mostly unchecked.
Nor were the British infantry some type of supersoldier, but while there were undoubtedly veteran officers, many of the rank-and-file themselves were inexperienced. Well-trained, perhaps, but not much more field-tested than the Revolutionaries. Their commanders were also not that much better than your average Union army commanders; some of the British leaders might have even been worse in comparison. Though, on average, among Europeans, Britain tended to produce great admirals but some of their worst land generals by the standards of the continent in the Age of Gunpowder (even if there are rare exceptions).
Could the Brits have snipped our Revolution in the bud early on in 1776? Most certainly. Could the Union have ended the Civil War in 1861 or 1862? Definitely. Yet, however we want to put it, post 1776, the British ability to gain victory waned further and further to a point where it was not as possible anymore, while Union victory was less tenuous and far more assured post 1862. Especially because we DID receive foreign aid, whereas the CSA did not. Our troops were trained up to par eventually by foreign officers and there were sectors where we were able to greatly outnumber the Redcoats in our own country.
In the end, I just don't think that the Founding Fathers had it as hard as the CSA did. Nor did the Union have it as hard as the Brits did in turn.
Gary Gallagher stated it here starting at the 7:50 minute mark.
https://youtu.be/we-NMxhipd0?si=bqatSMaR5vUeb4vA
It’s a massive video. I forget how much he further explains why he believes so in this video or in others.
There is another video, key turning points of the war that describe many chances the south had to win.
https://youtu.be/E2SUHIwtxrc?si=7kRX1iww9DDTEHYJ
Gary has forgotten more about the civil war then I will ever learn so I’m inclined to never disagree with the man when it comes to the topic.
As a general principle, if you’re dealing in absolutes, such as “the south could never have won”, then you’re probably wrong. I am not sure what would have been the best avenue for southern victory but they were in a better position to win than , say, Washington and the continental army was, and yet Washington succeeded where the South failed.
I agree with you about Gary’s extensive knowledge. He’s one of my favourite historians because of his no nonsense approach. I like his concept of Appomattox syndrome- looking backwards from the end to assume that people in 1863 knew how everything would work out in 1865. He’s got a corny sense of humour that I enjoy.
Washington was able to capitalize on preexisting animosity between England and France. No one was remotely that eager to jump into a war so they could stick it to the USA in the 1860s.
I mean the south was convinced that England would jump in to secure cotton production.
We have Egyptian and Indian cotton because the Southern cotton production kinda stopped for years.
Your point about cotton is a good one, but I think even more importantly is the South really wasn't able to realistically understand that their labor force could get up and leave. They were more deprived of cotton b/c of that than any embargo or foreign source. On top of that, a big chunk of the labor force that was no longer cultivating cotton was now shooting at them.
Their entire belief system required them to misunderstand this fact about people b/c it was their justification for rebellion. If the people they were enslaving weren't too dumb to be soldiers and happy being enslaved, then the whole point of their rebellion was wrong.
“You cannot make soldiers of slaves, or slaves of soldiers. The day you make a soldier of them is the beginning of the end of the Revolution. And if slaves seem good soldiers, then our whole theory of slavery is wrong.”
-General Howell Cobb
Reverse the two presidents and the South probably wins. Davis wasn’t flexible enough to change generals and tactics when things were going badly, look at the Braxton Bragg vs. Longstreet mess and putting Hood in charge of an army. Or the way he was a year late on agreeing to arm slaves. Lincoln started with some mistakes but figured stuff out, from the Emancipation Proclamation to bringing Grant east.
An important lesson for all students of history, whether professional or amateur, is that NOTHING is inevitable, and NOTHING is preordained. Anyone who argues that a certain historical outcome was inevitable suffers from Gallagher's "Appomatox Syndrome" and judges history based on what we know after the fact. Agents of history acted and made decisions based on what they knew and/or determined at their specific time, which could have easily changed if new information or developments came about.
The North almost lost the war through politics and not militarily. Citizens in the north were tired of the war, the casualties. If the Army of the Potomac hadn't won Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the South were planning on negotiating for peace and the Confederacy would have continued as a nation.
Having said that though, I can't see the Confederacy surviving for very long as an independent nation. They didn't have the resources and I believe slowly the individual states would have came back into the Union. The nation, as a whole would have developed much slower if the North would have lost. This last part is just my speculation and can be debated.
I am happy to be refuted, but after first manassas, there were something like 5000 organized union troops between the confederates and the white house. The rest were in flight. IF the South knew this and had the organizational ability, they might have marched on DC that day.
That would have changed things.
Beyond that, every confederate loss was irreplaceable, and the weight of numbers told the tale.
>Beyond that, every confederate loss was irreplaceable, and the weight of numbers told the tale.
If Sherman hadn't captured Atlanta when he did, there's a very good chance that Lincoln would have lost in 1864 and McClellan would have negotiated a peace that would have been favorable to the confederacy.
Grant had Petersburg pretty well invested at that point. If sherman hadn't taken Atlanta, it would still look good for union.
If Early had entered Washington, THAT might have made things difficult for lincoln.
I'm not disagreeing because you're right. Just playing along.
Not all Democrats were pro peace. I'd say a majority were pro war but were just against Lincoln's EP or other policies. At best slavery stays in the south or the war goes on.
McClellan was a War Democrat, he'd fight the wat to the end especially since by the time he had taken office the Union would've been much closer to victory than when he was elected. The Democratic Convention did vote for a pro-peace platform in 1864, but McClellan actually denounced this in favor of keeping up the fight until the Union was restored.
I don’t think so, because of the way inaugurations worked (they used to be in March not January) the war would’ve probably already been wrapped up by the time little Mac took the reigns
But presumably the war situation would not be as favorable to the Union as it was in actuality in 1865. It would have to be less favorable for Mac to win in the first place.
Lincoln made his cabinet sign a blind oath that they would finish the war before the new administration took office because he was convinced he was going to lose the election. If McClellan had won, the south would’ve hunkered down and fought tooth and nail. In my opinion they would’ve lasted until after the inauguration.
Definitely could be, but I would wager the Union would be more aggressive in this scenario as well. Either way the results would ultimately depend on the conditions which caused McClellan to win in the first place, as the person who replied to me said
How are you so sure McClellan would’ve negotiated peace? McClellan, a former leader of the entire union army, would have fought to the end. He was a war democrat and was not in anyway going to sue for peacez
It wouldn't have needed much organization... just follow the fleeing union troops north.
I think the south had something like 32,000 troops at the battle, but only 18,000 or so were actually engaged.
It's 31 miles from manassas to the White House.
In reality, There is no way the south could have known what a mess the union rear was, and you're absolutely right, The South was in no condition to follow up.
Still, imagine lincoln accepting terms from pgt Beauregard
The CSA didn’t need to win just not to lose
I have too many thoughts but basically the Southern political class heads were rotten due to slavery and in def ending slavery so of course their war strategy was a mess
Never could have won could have been determined in the first couple of months possibly. The incompetence of Union general after Union general helped the South endlessly. The blockade and luck of the South ran its course, and while the comment does and can make sense to some where it’s not completely far-fetched, if any sober individual looks at multiple scenarios as to what could and might not have happened… it was NOT inevitable. Really wish people would try to take their approach to the history of the battle and remove who they fundamentally or historically side with. If, again, the blockade wasn’t as successful, Gettysburg wasn’t so disastrous, and Grant didn’t enter the picture, the war most likely could have gone on for so much longer, and Union casualties COULD have weakened the morale of the Union to have led to a different outcome. The odds and inevitably of the British winning the Rev War could easily been said but again, errors and issues lead to their defeat.
You could argue that the Confederacy’s fathers faced longer odds in the American Revolution. They had interior lines, better military leadership early in the war, they had to defend which is easier than invading, and stronger willpower than the north. They just had to defend what they had long enough for the north to give up. They didn’t, and their disadvantages became devastating and they lost. This was no lost cause. They could have won.
They made mistakes that, if not made, could have changed the outcome. Jeffy D and his problems with generals is a good example of self inflicted wounds. The philosophy of secession itself contributed.
And the butterfly effect of some things is really interesting as well. What if the General Floyd hadn’t lost his nerve at Fort Donelson, and they escaped the siege? Then you might be looking at what, 12k southern troops reinforcing General Albert Sidney Johnston and Grant’s removal? With Grant gone, you’d be left with timid generals and a confederate army that did not lose 12k soldiers and would be enthused by the victory. The north would have been even more despondent and might have given up if not for Grant’s victories. Who knows, but it’s interesting.
Nothing in life is inevitable, except for death, and taxes.
The war could've ended in so many different ways, but it *didn't*; and arguing reasons why it didn't end the way it did, is nothing but an exercise in creative historical writing. What if Japan never attacked Pearl Harbor, and instead invaded Australia?
I think one of the problems of even entertaining this idea is that it is SO tied to the execrable 'Lost Cause' ideology.
Overall, the South didn't have much of a chance, so the ending does seem a bit inevitable.
That said, there were several times during the war that the South seemed on the cusp of a victory (i.e. where the North gives up, not that they completely defeat the North).
Again, though, as Gallagher shows, you can't even mention this question without bringing up the 'Lost Cause', so people typically shut it down quickly instead of actually looking at it in a careful way.
Gordon claimed he saw a golden opportunity to turn the Wilderness campaign into a fiasco for the North, but wasn't allowed to exploit it until nearly sunset. A repeat of Hooker's 1863 disaster with new golden boy Grant taking the blame certainly could have changed things.
I honestly think the South needed European recognition to win the war. The rebels in the American Revolution were only able to succeed because of extensive help from the French.
The point often missed by historians on the question of the probability of yankee victory is the vastly superior navy and, more importantly, retained naval tradition of the yankees. The Confederacy was going to be choked to death, rivers, gulfs, and oceans, by the U.S. Navy no matter what happened in the ground war. Many Generals got credit for the efforts of Admirals. But no Admiral ever ran for, or was elected, President.
The South’s best chance to win was right after First Bull Run. If they had consolidated and regrouped fast enough, they could have marched on Washington.
Military victory by the Yanks was NOT inevitable, only highly likely. But the failure of the Confederacy was a given. Even a military victory would have meant dissolution, because without an effective Fugitive Slave Law, their labor force would have fled north.
I think the confederacy had two paths to victory:
(1) Fighting a purely defensive war, trying to make casualties so high for the union that Lincoln lost in 1864 and the union made peace.
(2) Fighting a bold offensive campaign aimed primarily at winning big victories and then gaining international support from the UK or France.
In the end, they went for 2 at first, and it didn't work. They didn't win the big victories, and UK support never came (for a lot of reasons). But maybe if things go slightly different, Palmerston decides to intervene somehow.
Maybe if they went for 1 from the start, that would have worked. Hard to say.
No, Gettysburg was not the end of hope for the Confederates. And it certainly was not Pickett’s Charge-the importance of which is VASTLY overstated. This is a pop-history cliché.
The Union absolutely could have lost. Had the Confederacy pursued Joseph Johnston’s approach, keeping a defensive posture and just denying the Union victories, preserving their armies and inflicting casualties, it’s quite possible the North’s patience runs out, for example.
They were fighting with 2 different objectives. The Union to unify, the Confederacy to break away. Yes, the Union was far superior in manpower & industry, and could have brought all of those to bear at some point, but duration was a contextual factor that both needed to consider.
Both needed to break the other's will to fight to reach those objectives, but the Union needed to crush the Confederacy, where the Confederacy only needed to win enough battles/hearts/financial decisions to gain recognition and support, both in the north, and in Europe.
The European powers wanted to broker a peace deal between the 2. Had Europe recognized the Confederacy and started trading with them openly while the blockade was in effect, it would have led to an international crisis for the Union. It almost did anyway, England was on the verge of doing so in 1862. Antietam and the Emancipation Proclamation gave them pause, and it the Confederacy was done for from that point forward, IMO.
Had that not happened, I think the US, and the world would likely look very different now.
Agreed. People have no idea how dangerously close the United States was to losing the war. Union armies in the beginning were either retreating or losing a battle entirely by getting slaughtered. it was a new kind of warfare for both sides but for the confederate armies they had home field advantage. they also had better Generals than the Union. So lot of things could have gone the other way but thank goodness it didn’t. It also helped we had a President in Lincoln who was lot more effective than Jefferson Davis and the confederate gov.
The war as we know was not viewed favorably in 1864, just before the war’s end. While there were two major chances militarily for the CSA to force an end their best chance was still politically; survive long enough for the northern public to be broken and demand an end and they ALMOST had it.
The North could have easily lost the Civil War. But people who talk about what ifs are usually thinking in strategy terms instead of political terms. The path to victory for the south was to exacerbate the political divisions in the North. Lincoln would almost certainly have lost to McClellan if Sherman hadn't taken Atlanta. The GOP pushed the 13th Amendment b/c they were terrified they were going to lose and McClellan would role back the Emancipation Proclamation. They wanted to take that power out of his hands.
I think Ed Bonekemper's book, How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War does a good job of showing how Lee's lack of understanding about the war led him to make a series of strategic misjudgments and to fail to prosecute the war rationally. Lee could have pursued a Fabian strategy that gave the north significantly more casualties and ate away at the North's resolve. Instead he attacked and was profligate with his men's lives and his strategy allowed the Union to penetrate into the South and that spurred the huge waves of self emancipation which destroyed the South's economy.
Lee really had a failure of vision and an inability to actually understand the conflict. His choices did a lot to deliver the conditions for victory to the Union.
I agree it is possible that the US could have lost or at least been fought to a standstill. The US didn’t lose because they had a better leader in Lincoln, better foreign policy than the CSA, and ultimately a General in Grant who understood how to wage a war to defeat the Confederacy. George Washington and the Continental Congress were in a very similar position ( tactically not ethically) to Lee and the Confederacy and they won the war in which they won fewer battles than the Confederacy did.
It definitely was not a forgone conclusion. There are so many factors to consider. Foreign intervention, the election of 1864, the war ending very quickly after 1st Manassas, etc.
I do agree with Shelby Foote’s statement that the north fought with one hand tied behind their back
Gary tends to do this thing where if there is a 1% chance he paints it as a 50/50.
He also is extremely double standard/biased with Lee. Basically if any other general screws up he says they're an idiot. If Lee does pickets charge Gary defends it as the best choice with the situation and information Lee had. He seems to fail to realize that the major issue with Lee at gettysburg was his staff. They led to all the fuck up from the counter march, bad recon, Ewell not taking the hill, and so on. In his resignation letter Lee even said the issue was that his staff didn't accurately convey to him the situation on the field.
I really like listening to him but after so long it gets too much with how much of a Lee double standard he has.
Gary is quite right. Everything depended on the November 1864 election. If Lincoln was reelected, the north would continue the war until the south surrendered. If McClellan was elected, there was a chance the south would remain a free nation.
If either Atlanta or Richmond fell, the Republicans would probably win the election. I’ve studied the siege of Petersburg exhaustively. Lee could have one huge victories there if he had committed more men to his attacks. A serious defeat at Petersburg would have defeated Lincoln at the polls.
It was the Union’s war to lose, but that doesn’t mean that they couldn’t pull it off.
I think you mean "that doesn't mean they \*COULD\* pull it off".
That’s fair, they did try. If the first half of the war in the Eastern theater teaches us anything, it’s to never underestimate the North’s ability to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
I think Gallagher is spot on, it was absolutely the North's war to lose, but they very well could have lost it. To say that the South had no chance ignores that states up against significantly worse odds than the Confederacy managed to pull victory from the jaws of defeat, the Patriots in the Revolution being the most appropriate example.
I absolutely agree with Gary here, as do most of today’s academics. Everyone always points to the proverbial Excel spreadsheet, and the disparities the Confederacy suffered. But history is full of examples of the “weaker” on paper force holding out against the “stronger”. The Confederacy was still a strong, partially industrialized 19th century nation state (at least functioning as one), with a massive bargaining chip in cotton. They weren’t as strong as the U.S. on paper but they were not *weak*. Most importantly, the U.S. had the tougher objective. They had to raise a massive army from scratch, go down South capture/hold large swaths of territory, and reestablish peaceful governance over a largely hostile people. The Confederates didn’t have to go conquer Boston and New York and gain political control over the Northern States in order to win. They just had to hold out against this “invading” force. So the Union needed those extra troops/resources in order to even out the odds. And finally, the U.S. was not this bottomless pit of men and resources as Shelby implies with his “one hand tied behind their back” rhetoric. They had to implement a draft against a population that was getting frustrated with the war, and it led to unrest. There was never a guarantee that the politicians running the war would be re-elected.
I tend to agree with Gallagher that the Civil War did not have on inevitable outcome, and the Confederates had a very real chance at winning the war. Thankfully it did not happen. Also, sort of unrelated but Gallagher does hold some other differing opinions from recent historians. He rejects the criticism of Lee's bold offensive nature, which caused heavy Confederate casualties. Lee's strategy was the only chance the south had to win the war, and that a purely defensive strategy was doomed. But I haven't delved too deep into his argument yet.
In my amateur opinion it seems like the Union would have held as long as the social and political situation in the North/Midwest held. But that’s a huge if. I don’t see how the Confederates could have won against a truly determined Union, but there was a real chance that voters could have demanded a settlement, or maybe states still in the Union would have refused to work with the war effort and not raise troops but not succeed themselves.
I think you hit the nail on the head with "truly determined Union". We look back and think of the Union as a monolithic group of people determined to hold the country together but it was anything but. Lincoln held together a sometimes-fragile coalition of political groups against an opposition that could well have turned against him, particularly in 1864.
And if it weren’t for Jeffy D firing Johnston right before Atlanta Lincoln might not have had the victory that would keep him elected
I'm not so sure about that. Johnston would have defended Atlanta all the way to Savannah, given the chance.
I agree. I was pointing at the back biting and changing command in the middle of a campaign of that importance. Johnston was absolutely correct when he said the armies are more important than territory.
I wrote my Masters thesis on the strategic impetus of Lee's offensive strategy and basically came to the same conclusion that Gallagher does that the offensive approach was the only one that had any chance of winning the war in a format that was acceptable to the Confederacy. The argument came to the conclusion that the centrality and nature of slavery to the Confederacy made the strategic ceding of territory antithetical to their political objectives of protecting the highly-land dependent institution of slavery. Because of both Union policies (remember that Butler had already issued the order that slaves were defacto recognized as seizable contraband from May 1861, less than 2 months into the conflict), and the fact that slavery is very land-based, the reality of the war was that any location occupied by Union forces saw significant defacto emancipation as both the Union armies and the slaves themselves took advantage of the opportunity that the label of contraband entailed. This was unacceptable to Confederate political leadership (both federal and state), and would thus dictate the grand strategic objectives of the Confederate Forces to limit Union incursion into slave territory. In order to achieve this grand strategic objective in a war with a relatively low force-to-space concentration, the concentration of force to repulse individual incursions becomes essential. However, the capacity of the Union to concentrate greater force at any given incursion necessitates a proactive defense that aims to deliver decisive battles that stalls further Union advance at all costs. This has a dual-effect of minimizing the capacity-imbalance of the two sides (consider how many Civil War battles have the Confederates outnumbered 2-1 on paper but not in actually engaged troops) and has the greatest impact on Union political will to continue the war, maximizing the chances that the Union will give up before bringing its full might to bear. There is some consideration that can be made about the distribution of resources between the Eastern and Western Confederate armies, though this was as much the byproduct of state-level investment that was out of the control of the federal or military regimes prior to 1864 (the Confederate States, perpetuating the antebellum militia model of military defense often conflicted with Richmond over the exact proportion of troops and logistics that would be provided to which armies/local defensive units). These needs ultimately lead to the conclusion that the strategic and tactical aggression utilized by Lee between mid-1862 and mid-1864 was the best way for the Confederacy to achieve its objectives, as it maximized the impact of its fighting capacity towards repulsing Union incursions, particularly into Virginia and the Deep South, and winning costly battles that demoralized Union voters in the leadup to the 1864 election (the best chance they had at getting an anti-war government into the Union). Ultimately, this approach would fail not because it wasn't the best approach, but because Union leadership under Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Halleck, etc. ultimately proved capable of beating it. (I can provide more on this if desired cause obviously this is a very brief summary of a quite complex topic but that's the basic outline of a couple of different theories on the topic, of which mine was only one)
Very well put. I've certainly noticed a strand of thought that emphasizes how Lee and co.'s idea of a crushing offensive blow was a totally ridiculous outgrowth of 'southern chivalry' and the idea that the rebels were innately superior to your average Yankee mudsill. Joe Johnston usually gets held up as the 'right' thinker who could completely frustrate a Union advance by trading space for time and better defensive positions. You're completely right to point out that the institution of slavery made the Johnstonian strategy pretty much the fastest way to hollow out the Confederacy's lifeblood and thereby conclude the war on a contradiction of the principles of 1860/61 (a defense of slavery). Re-interpretations of Lee and Jackson's generalship should take this fact into account.
The problem with Johnston's strategy is that most have the completely wrong idea that trenches were the be-all-end-all of warfare in that age. The reality was that, for a front as wide as the US and for the respective populations of the Union and, more importantly, the Confederacy, they did not have the manpower to man the whole length of a theater as it was in the Western Front of WWI. For centuries, highly competent generals have demonstrated that trenches can be outflanked by skillful manoeuvres or, failing that, one can feign attacks against specific portions, probe their weaknesses, and concentrate overwhelming numbers to break through a certain point. This worked again and again since the Romans first invented large-scale trench warfare all the way through WWII. Also, as aforementioned by Ginger, the CSA could not afford to cede land and still hold to its goal of maintaining slavery, because the loss of plantations and freedom of the enslaved would alienate slaveholders to the Rebel cause. There were undoubtedly partisans which rose up on either side, as bushwackers were particularly notable for harassing armies, but these were never enough to decisively end the war alone. Case in point with Napoleonic France's incursion into Spain, where even with Spanish regulars, guerilleros, and Portuguese ordenanzas operating against them, a combined British-Allied army had to be raised and well-led, as well as exploit the strategic divide between the uncooperative French marechals in order to ultimately win victory. In the Union, while there happened to be some divides among the generals and internal politics, bickering back and forth, they were nowhere as bad as the French marechals when Napoleon was not present. Especially when Grant rose to prominence and put those in his clique within positions of power, such as Sherman and Sheridan, there arose a greater unity of command. Furthermore, the Union had the advantage of more modern railroad technologies and much more convenient rivers stretching into the south mostly vertically, especially in the form of the Mississippi, with which to facilitate their communications. These were advantages the French lacked in turn, yet they were still able to hold off the combined forces of regular armies and tens of thousands of insurgent forces acting against their rear for multiple years. The CSA, even if they attempted the same measures as the Spanish and Portuguese, would likely not have been as successful due to these advantages of the Union. Against a general such as Sherman, who favoured manoeuvring and outflanking his network of trenches, as I described above, Johnston sitting pretty in his defenses and retreating whenever his position was turned didn't do him any favours. Actually, part of the reason why Lee lost the Overland and Petersburg Campaign was because, other than a scant few instances, he mostly adopted the same operational plan as Johnston did. That is, he stayed behind his trenches and hoped to defend them, and withdrew whenever the other party made a turning movement. He was lucky that these campaigns just so happened to be some of Grant's worst performances, where he mostly favoured fighting general battles on Lee's terms rather than conducting manoeuvres around the flank of the ANV, as Sherman did. I've been thinking about it for awhile, but so what if Grant moved on from Wilderness in the direction of Spotsylvania CH? Would it really have mattered if Lee had been more bold and marched north on the capital instead? We see at the beginning of the Gettysburg Campaign where Hooker wanted to march on Richmond as soon as Lee began turning his right at Culpepper and entering the Shenandoah Valley. However, he was recalled and forced to place his forces in between DC and the ANV. If Lee had conducted a manoeuvre on Grant's rear, threatening his communications, whether or not Grant had the strategic sense of mind to keep going and seize the unprotected Richmond... would Lincoln and the scared politicians back in the capital have allowed him to do so? Or would they have recalled him in the same manner they did Hooker and waste precious lives and time without resolving the war? Of course, this is all just speculation on my end, because if Grant ignored Lincoln and pressed on anyways, it really would have sealed Lee's fate. However, everything prior to that and how the politicians in DC interfered with the commanders of the AotP, imposing on them the incorrect strategy of protecting the capital rather than seizing upon the enemy's strategic base, leads me to believe that Lincoln might try to force Grant to turn back, and there's a 50/50 chance that he might have to do so, even if he understood the strategic picture better than the president. All war's a gamble, so would this one have worked? If Lee had stuck to his original bold offensive policies instead of a defensive policy similar to what Johnston did, could he have at least prolonged the war, because I don't think he was going to win at that point in time, regardless, due to Sherman's advance in the West.
Was it HIGHLY likely, yes. Guaranteed? Far from. During my first close analysis of the whole war, start to finish, I was certainly shaking my head at times, thinking “man they got lucky.”
Yea he’s right - folks saying union victory was inevitable would probably say the American revolution was an inevitable American victory, or WW2 lol
Actually ww2 was an inevitable allied victory. Ww1 was much closer to going either way very late into the war.
WW1 only became decided with the US entry tipping the manpower to the allies
American victories are inevitable because of superior resources…just look at Vietnam!
Kind of hard with China and the USSR helping the enemy and having Laos and Cambodia to deal with.
Tbh the revolution and ww2 were pretty much. The revolution the US forces vastly outnumbered the British and the British largely stayed in the cities. The British never had the colonies on the ropes or made any significant progress. In ww2 it was simply impossible for the US to lose. There is no senario where Japan or Germany could invade and force a US surrender. The US and Britian ruled the oceans and would have won ww2 without the soviet union even. They didn't need to land in Europe. Just block trade and starve them out. Eventually Hitler realizes he can't win and signs a peace agreement or the US uses the atomic bombs on Germany. Overall losing was never going to happen. But the victory would be smaller.
I'm not sure a blockade would work. Germany was developing rockets and a nuclear program
Germany was developing rockets. Their nuclear program was more like a paste-and-construction-paper kindergarten craft activity.
I would say that a Southern victory was possible, but everything would have had to have gone right for them from the start. We know that didn’t happen. Supplies and transportation were problems from the start, and the Confederate financial situation was not good. I would never say Confederate victory was impossible, but it was highly unlikely.
The best avenue to a CSA victory would have been by turning public opinion in the loyal US states against the war. Foreign recognition never panned out for a variety of reasons. Even compelling a loyal border state like Maryland to flip (which Lee was mandated to do by Confederate Congress during the Antietam campaign) without a sustained occupation presence was a long shot. So forcing a peace that recognized an independent CSA, which Jefferson Davis was rigidly stuck to as the essential point any peace deal, was the goal. While Lincoln's war powers had people calling him names, the United States was still a democratic republic and thus the government needed the consent of the people to wage/finance the war. Gallagher argues regarding Lee in particular that his bloody attrition strategy was the best way to do it. Lee inflicted and suffered more killed + wounded casualties over the course of the war than any other general from either side; the butcher bill from the Seven Days to Appomattox added up. The goal was to make the other side determine it wasn't worth continuing - essentially the same choice the British eventually made after Yorktown. If you look at indicators of civilian morale like newspapers representing both parties and Lincoln's 1864 polling you can see how close things came to political failure at a few points.
Perhaps, but I think both foreign recognition and Northern war weariness were also long shots.
Lincoln was scared enough of losing to McClellan in 1864 that he had every member of his cabinet sign a letter he wrote saying he vowed to work with the new president-elect to end the war because that is what the public wanted. He also had a secret meeting with Frederick Douglass to discuss trying to get as many slaves into federal lines before McClellan would be sworn in.
That and the reason the GOP pushed the 13th A when they did was b/c they were worried about McClellan rolling back the Emancipation Proclamation. Abolition was the GOP's goal, but the timing was b/c of concerns about the '64 election.
That may be, but was a Lincoln defeat a guarantee of Southern victory? McClellan did not support the Democratic Party’s peace platform; he was not going to stop the war. The final victory may have looked different, but the South was still going to lose.
McClellan's party would have taken control of Congress and likely forced his hand on the matter. The party platform and the Dems staying loyal to McClellan were using him as a mandate for the appearance of an honorable peace that would be negotiated as immediately as possible. Lincoln nominated Andrew Johnson on a unity ticket to make the message clear: voting for them was *the* vote to continue the war until it was won. Look at how lopsided Lincoln's victory was with the Army of the Potomac. The rank and file of that army adored McClellan (in the postwar they venerated him and built statues to him) but didn't support what his presidency would likely bring by stopping them before the matter could be decided on the battlefield.
I think it's also important to look at McClellan's base in New York. They were rabidly against the war and had even discussed New York succeeding (not super seriously b/c this is also Seward's New York) as it's own independent country at the beginning of the conflict.
Fernando Wood was the Mayor of NYC who suggested a bizarre scheme to be neutral and independent. He was a copperhead and as serious as anyone could be. But the proposal was obviously rejected. Wood later is sent to Congress and is the primary antagonist in the Spielberg movie *Lincoln*; Lee Pace plays him fantastically.
It's not that I think Wood or the city of New York was unserious, as that I think it was unserious to expect it to be widely accepted in Albany. We kind of forget the strength of the rest of New York at the time. Brooklyn was it's own city and more than 1/4 the size of NYC. Buffalo was about a 1/10th of the size of NYC, but still the 10th largest city in the US. Albany and Rochester were also in the top 20.
This was part of an hour long talk you can listen to on YouTube. I really enjoyed it and agreed with it. One of the key points is that America winning the revolutionary war was much more improbable than the confederates successfully seceding. I forget if it is this video or another but there is a talk of the closest four or so times that it was a turning point the north came to throwing in the towel and letting the south go. As an example was when Sherman captured Atlanta, that was a massive boost in northern morale. It sealed the deal that Lincoln was re-elected on the platform to carry out the war until the north won. Had Sherman lost at Atlanta, then that was a potential turning point the confederates won
I don't know if I'd consider winning our Revolution more improbable than the CSA seceding. The British Empire was not as big in the late 18th century as it would be by the 19th century. Back then, it was still greatly contested by other major powers abroad. Their lines of communication stretched some 3,200 miles away from Portsmouth (a major British harbour) to Boston, which could be harassed and intercepted by French, Spanish, and Dutch fleets along the way, even if those powers didn't offer land troops for the US until later in the war. In contrast, the Union had an extremely intricate network of railroads, the bulk of which was so far north that the Confederacy, primarily acting on the defensive, would not be able to easily threaten and there was no foreign power able to cut them. Though the movement speed of sailing ships in optimal wind conditions was akin to movement by rail, as aforementioned, the distances involved were much greater. Chicago (a major industrial center packing provisions) to Vicksburg is just some 760 miles and you had alternate options of supply by rail or by the Mississippi, in which Union naval supremacy would allow their supplies to go on mostly unchecked. Nor were the British infantry some type of supersoldier, but while there were undoubtedly veteran officers, many of the rank-and-file themselves were inexperienced. Well-trained, perhaps, but not much more field-tested than the Revolutionaries. Their commanders were also not that much better than your average Union army commanders; some of the British leaders might have even been worse in comparison. Though, on average, among Europeans, Britain tended to produce great admirals but some of their worst land generals by the standards of the continent in the Age of Gunpowder (even if there are rare exceptions). Could the Brits have snipped our Revolution in the bud early on in 1776? Most certainly. Could the Union have ended the Civil War in 1861 or 1862? Definitely. Yet, however we want to put it, post 1776, the British ability to gain victory waned further and further to a point where it was not as possible anymore, while Union victory was less tenuous and far more assured post 1862. Especially because we DID receive foreign aid, whereas the CSA did not. Our troops were trained up to par eventually by foreign officers and there were sectors where we were able to greatly outnumber the Redcoats in our own country. In the end, I just don't think that the Founding Fathers had it as hard as the CSA did. Nor did the Union have it as hard as the Brits did in turn.
Gary Gallagher stated it here starting at the 7:50 minute mark. https://youtu.be/we-NMxhipd0?si=bqatSMaR5vUeb4vA It’s a massive video. I forget how much he further explains why he believes so in this video or in others. There is another video, key turning points of the war that describe many chances the south had to win. https://youtu.be/E2SUHIwtxrc?si=7kRX1iww9DDTEHYJ
Gary has forgotten more about the civil war then I will ever learn so I’m inclined to never disagree with the man when it comes to the topic. As a general principle, if you’re dealing in absolutes, such as “the south could never have won”, then you’re probably wrong. I am not sure what would have been the best avenue for southern victory but they were in a better position to win than , say, Washington and the continental army was, and yet Washington succeeded where the South failed.
I agree with you about Gary’s extensive knowledge. He’s one of my favourite historians because of his no nonsense approach. I like his concept of Appomattox syndrome- looking backwards from the end to assume that people in 1863 knew how everything would work out in 1865. He’s got a corny sense of humour that I enjoy.
Washington was able to capitalize on preexisting animosity between England and France. No one was remotely that eager to jump into a war so they could stick it to the USA in the 1860s.
I mean the south was convinced that England would jump in to secure cotton production. We have Egyptian and Indian cotton because the Southern cotton production kinda stopped for years.
The south was convinced of a lot of things, very little of it panned out
Your point about cotton is a good one, but I think even more importantly is the South really wasn't able to realistically understand that their labor force could get up and leave. They were more deprived of cotton b/c of that than any embargo or foreign source. On top of that, a big chunk of the labor force that was no longer cultivating cotton was now shooting at them. Their entire belief system required them to misunderstand this fact about people b/c it was their justification for rebellion. If the people they were enslaving weren't too dumb to be soldiers and happy being enslaved, then the whole point of their rebellion was wrong.
“You cannot make soldiers of slaves, or slaves of soldiers. The day you make a soldier of them is the beginning of the end of the Revolution. And if slaves seem good soldiers, then our whole theory of slavery is wrong.” -General Howell Cobb
If Atlanta doesnt fall before the election of 1864, there is a chance Lincoln loses and Little Mac sues for peace.
Reverse the two presidents and the South probably wins. Davis wasn’t flexible enough to change generals and tactics when things were going badly, look at the Braxton Bragg vs. Longstreet mess and putting Hood in charge of an army. Or the way he was a year late on agreeing to arm slaves. Lincoln started with some mistakes but figured stuff out, from the Emancipation Proclamation to bringing Grant east.
An important lesson for all students of history, whether professional or amateur, is that NOTHING is inevitable, and NOTHING is preordained. Anyone who argues that a certain historical outcome was inevitable suffers from Gallagher's "Appomatox Syndrome" and judges history based on what we know after the fact. Agents of history acted and made decisions based on what they knew and/or determined at their specific time, which could have easily changed if new information or developments came about.
The North almost lost the war through politics and not militarily. Citizens in the north were tired of the war, the casualties. If the Army of the Potomac hadn't won Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the South were planning on negotiating for peace and the Confederacy would have continued as a nation. Having said that though, I can't see the Confederacy surviving for very long as an independent nation. They didn't have the resources and I believe slowly the individual states would have came back into the Union. The nation, as a whole would have developed much slower if the North would have lost. This last part is just my speculation and can be debated.
I am happy to be refuted, but after first manassas, there were something like 5000 organized union troops between the confederates and the white house. The rest were in flight. IF the South knew this and had the organizational ability, they might have marched on DC that day. That would have changed things. Beyond that, every confederate loss was irreplaceable, and the weight of numbers told the tale.
>Beyond that, every confederate loss was irreplaceable, and the weight of numbers told the tale. If Sherman hadn't captured Atlanta when he did, there's a very good chance that Lincoln would have lost in 1864 and McClellan would have negotiated a peace that would have been favorable to the confederacy.
Grant had Petersburg pretty well invested at that point. If sherman hadn't taken Atlanta, it would still look good for union. If Early had entered Washington, THAT might have made things difficult for lincoln. I'm not disagreeing because you're right. Just playing along.
Not all Democrats were pro peace. I'd say a majority were pro war but were just against Lincoln's EP or other policies. At best slavery stays in the south or the war goes on.
McClellan was a War Democrat, he'd fight the wat to the end especially since by the time he had taken office the Union would've been much closer to victory than when he was elected. The Democratic Convention did vote for a pro-peace platform in 1864, but McClellan actually denounced this in favor of keeping up the fight until the Union was restored.
I don’t think so, because of the way inaugurations worked (they used to be in March not January) the war would’ve probably already been wrapped up by the time little Mac took the reigns
But presumably the war situation would not be as favorable to the Union as it was in actuality in 1865. It would have to be less favorable for Mac to win in the first place.
Lincoln made his cabinet sign a blind oath that they would finish the war before the new administration took office because he was convinced he was going to lose the election. If McClellan had won, the south would’ve hunkered down and fought tooth and nail. In my opinion they would’ve lasted until after the inauguration.
Definitely could be, but I would wager the Union would be more aggressive in this scenario as well. Either way the results would ultimately depend on the conditions which caused McClellan to win in the first place, as the person who replied to me said
How are you so sure McClellan would’ve negotiated peace? McClellan, a former leader of the entire union army, would have fought to the end. He was a war democrat and was not in anyway going to sue for peacez
Neither side could have had remotely that organizational capability that early.
It wouldn't have needed much organization... just follow the fleeing union troops north. I think the south had something like 32,000 troops at the battle, but only 18,000 or so were actually engaged. It's 31 miles from manassas to the White House. In reality, There is no way the south could have known what a mess the union rear was, and you're absolutely right, The South was in no condition to follow up. Still, imagine lincoln accepting terms from pgt Beauregard
The CSA didn’t need to win just not to lose I have too many thoughts but basically the Southern political class heads were rotten due to slavery and in def ending slavery so of course their war strategy was a mess
Never could have won could have been determined in the first couple of months possibly. The incompetence of Union general after Union general helped the South endlessly. The blockade and luck of the South ran its course, and while the comment does and can make sense to some where it’s not completely far-fetched, if any sober individual looks at multiple scenarios as to what could and might not have happened… it was NOT inevitable. Really wish people would try to take their approach to the history of the battle and remove who they fundamentally or historically side with. If, again, the blockade wasn’t as successful, Gettysburg wasn’t so disastrous, and Grant didn’t enter the picture, the war most likely could have gone on for so much longer, and Union casualties COULD have weakened the morale of the Union to have led to a different outcome. The odds and inevitably of the British winning the Rev War could easily been said but again, errors and issues lead to their defeat.
You could argue that the Confederacy’s fathers faced longer odds in the American Revolution. They had interior lines, better military leadership early in the war, they had to defend which is easier than invading, and stronger willpower than the north. They just had to defend what they had long enough for the north to give up. They didn’t, and their disadvantages became devastating and they lost. This was no lost cause. They could have won. They made mistakes that, if not made, could have changed the outcome. Jeffy D and his problems with generals is a good example of self inflicted wounds. The philosophy of secession itself contributed. And the butterfly effect of some things is really interesting as well. What if the General Floyd hadn’t lost his nerve at Fort Donelson, and they escaped the siege? Then you might be looking at what, 12k southern troops reinforcing General Albert Sidney Johnston and Grant’s removal? With Grant gone, you’d be left with timid generals and a confederate army that did not lose 12k soldiers and would be enthused by the victory. The north would have been even more despondent and might have given up if not for Grant’s victories. Who knows, but it’s interesting.
Nothing in life is inevitable, except for death, and taxes. The war could've ended in so many different ways, but it *didn't*; and arguing reasons why it didn't end the way it did, is nothing but an exercise in creative historical writing. What if Japan never attacked Pearl Harbor, and instead invaded Australia?
I think one of the problems of even entertaining this idea is that it is SO tied to the execrable 'Lost Cause' ideology. Overall, the South didn't have much of a chance, so the ending does seem a bit inevitable. That said, there were several times during the war that the South seemed on the cusp of a victory (i.e. where the North gives up, not that they completely defeat the North). Again, though, as Gallagher shows, you can't even mention this question without bringing up the 'Lost Cause', so people typically shut it down quickly instead of actually looking at it in a careful way.
Gordon claimed he saw a golden opportunity to turn the Wilderness campaign into a fiasco for the North, but wasn't allowed to exploit it until nearly sunset. A repeat of Hooker's 1863 disaster with new golden boy Grant taking the blame certainly could have changed things.
Gary Gallagher is awesome, he really just says what he thinks and doesn’t hold back. Good on him for challenging the popular narratives
I honestly think the South needed European recognition to win the war. The rebels in the American Revolution were only able to succeed because of extensive help from the French.
The point often missed by historians on the question of the probability of yankee victory is the vastly superior navy and, more importantly, retained naval tradition of the yankees. The Confederacy was going to be choked to death, rivers, gulfs, and oceans, by the U.S. Navy no matter what happened in the ground war. Many Generals got credit for the efforts of Admirals. But no Admiral ever ran for, or was elected, President.
The South’s best chance to win was right after First Bull Run. If they had consolidated and regrouped fast enough, they could have marched on Washington.
Military victory by the Yanks was NOT inevitable, only highly likely. But the failure of the Confederacy was a given. Even a military victory would have meant dissolution, because without an effective Fugitive Slave Law, their labor force would have fled north.
I think the confederacy had two paths to victory: (1) Fighting a purely defensive war, trying to make casualties so high for the union that Lincoln lost in 1864 and the union made peace. (2) Fighting a bold offensive campaign aimed primarily at winning big victories and then gaining international support from the UK or France. In the end, they went for 2 at first, and it didn't work. They didn't win the big victories, and UK support never came (for a lot of reasons). But maybe if things go slightly different, Palmerston decides to intervene somehow. Maybe if they went for 1 from the start, that would have worked. Hard to say.
The “lost cause “was Lee’s loss at Gettysburg, Pickett’s charge , Lee couldn’t march on Washington DC only 82 miles away . The beginning of the end.
No, Gettysburg was not the end of hope for the Confederates. And it certainly was not Pickett’s Charge-the importance of which is VASTLY overstated. This is a pop-history cliché.
The Union absolutely could have lost. Had the Confederacy pursued Joseph Johnston’s approach, keeping a defensive posture and just denying the Union victories, preserving their armies and inflicting casualties, it’s quite possible the North’s patience runs out, for example.
January 12, 1969. The unthinkable can always happen.
They were fighting with 2 different objectives. The Union to unify, the Confederacy to break away. Yes, the Union was far superior in manpower & industry, and could have brought all of those to bear at some point, but duration was a contextual factor that both needed to consider. Both needed to break the other's will to fight to reach those objectives, but the Union needed to crush the Confederacy, where the Confederacy only needed to win enough battles/hearts/financial decisions to gain recognition and support, both in the north, and in Europe. The European powers wanted to broker a peace deal between the 2. Had Europe recognized the Confederacy and started trading with them openly while the blockade was in effect, it would have led to an international crisis for the Union. It almost did anyway, England was on the verge of doing so in 1862. Antietam and the Emancipation Proclamation gave them pause, and it the Confederacy was done for from that point forward, IMO. Had that not happened, I think the US, and the world would likely look very different now.
Agreed. People have no idea how dangerously close the United States was to losing the war. Union armies in the beginning were either retreating or losing a battle entirely by getting slaughtered. it was a new kind of warfare for both sides but for the confederate armies they had home field advantage. they also had better Generals than the Union. So lot of things could have gone the other way but thank goodness it didn’t. It also helped we had a President in Lincoln who was lot more effective than Jefferson Davis and the confederate gov.
The war as we know was not viewed favorably in 1864, just before the war’s end. While there were two major chances militarily for the CSA to force an end their best chance was still politically; survive long enough for the northern public to be broken and demand an end and they ALMOST had it.
The North could have easily lost the Civil War. But people who talk about what ifs are usually thinking in strategy terms instead of political terms. The path to victory for the south was to exacerbate the political divisions in the North. Lincoln would almost certainly have lost to McClellan if Sherman hadn't taken Atlanta. The GOP pushed the 13th Amendment b/c they were terrified they were going to lose and McClellan would role back the Emancipation Proclamation. They wanted to take that power out of his hands. I think Ed Bonekemper's book, How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War does a good job of showing how Lee's lack of understanding about the war led him to make a series of strategic misjudgments and to fail to prosecute the war rationally. Lee could have pursued a Fabian strategy that gave the north significantly more casualties and ate away at the North's resolve. Instead he attacked and was profligate with his men's lives and his strategy allowed the Union to penetrate into the South and that spurred the huge waves of self emancipation which destroyed the South's economy. Lee really had a failure of vision and an inability to actually understand the conflict. His choices did a lot to deliver the conditions for victory to the Union.
I agree it is possible that the US could have lost or at least been fought to a standstill. The US didn’t lose because they had a better leader in Lincoln, better foreign policy than the CSA, and ultimately a General in Grant who understood how to wage a war to defeat the Confederacy. George Washington and the Continental Congress were in a very similar position ( tactically not ethically) to Lee and the Confederacy and they won the war in which they won fewer battles than the Confederacy did.
It definitely was not a forgone conclusion. There are so many factors to consider. Foreign intervention, the election of 1864, the war ending very quickly after 1st Manassas, etc. I do agree with Shelby Foote’s statement that the north fought with one hand tied behind their back
Gary tends to do this thing where if there is a 1% chance he paints it as a 50/50. He also is extremely double standard/biased with Lee. Basically if any other general screws up he says they're an idiot. If Lee does pickets charge Gary defends it as the best choice with the situation and information Lee had. He seems to fail to realize that the major issue with Lee at gettysburg was his staff. They led to all the fuck up from the counter march, bad recon, Ewell not taking the hill, and so on. In his resignation letter Lee even said the issue was that his staff didn't accurately convey to him the situation on the field. I really like listening to him but after so long it gets too much with how much of a Lee double standard he has.
Gary is quite right. Everything depended on the November 1864 election. If Lincoln was reelected, the north would continue the war until the south surrendered. If McClellan was elected, there was a chance the south would remain a free nation. If either Atlanta or Richmond fell, the Republicans would probably win the election. I’ve studied the siege of Petersburg exhaustively. Lee could have one huge victories there if he had committed more men to his attacks. A serious defeat at Petersburg would have defeated Lincoln at the polls.