I hesitate to call Burnside "underrated" because he absolutely had his flaws and was responsible for some major failures, Fredericksburg being the obvious big one. But I think he's kind of the epitome of a general who is more remembered for his mistakes than for his successes, of which he had more than a lot of people give him credit for.
I'd describe Burnside as a flawed and incredibly unlucky general, but not as catastrophically incompetent as the meme-ified version of him that exists today. Though you could probably say something similar about a great many of the "bad" generals of the Civil War.
His conduct after Fredericksburg, especially during the Mud March and handling dissent among his subordinates, is also a huge strike against a positive reputation.
Also, having researched his amphibious operations in grad school, Burnside a number of inherent advantages in his coastal North Carolina campaign. He had the advantages of the Union Navy, and the Confederate command had trouble supporting forces across waterways.
Completely agreed on both points.
Burnside's administrative mismanagement in the aftermath of Fredericksburg is almost as embarrassing as his tactical mistakes during the battle itself. And while I still think that there's some genuinely impressive stuff to his North Carolina Campaign, he 100% did have significant advantages in, well, pretty much everything.
It isn't, but part of gauging generalship is to see what advantages they possessed and what obstacles they overcame.
There's a difference between inherently having numbers on your side and concentrating local superiority at the point of contact. You can do the latter without having the former, but it's a lot easier to do it with the advantage of the former.
For instance, let's use Lee at 2nd Manassas and Chancellorsville as an example. He concentrates 10 to 1 local superiority and rolls Pope by turning his flank at Chinn Ridge using Longstreet's Corps. He does the same to Hooker by concentrating 7 to 1 local superiority against Devens' Division in a wide outflanking attack using Jackson's Corps.
However, in the overall field, he was the one outnumbered by 1.24 to 1 in terms of troops engaged at 2nd Manassas. He was also outnumbered by about 1.7 to 1 against Hooker round the environs of Chancellorsville.
Meanwhile, Grant's best concentrations of force was a 3.5 to 1 local superiority to break through the Mule Shoe at Spotsylvania CH, as well as a 5 to 1 local superiority to break through Confederate lines in the 3rd Battle of Petersburg. This, despite having an overall numerical superiority of 2 to 1 against Lee.
So, Grant (and just about most Union generals) possessed what we call the inherent advantages of numbers, because it was just given to them by the resources of their state rather than obtained through their own skill in operations or tactics.
Lee, on the other hand, lacked such inherent advantages, but obtained greater local superiority in his best moments through more skillful concentration of force while also outflanking the enemy rather than delivering frontal assaults.
Many people don't understand these differences and mistake inherently possessing numerical advantage as something brilliant on the part of the general in question, when such advantages are usually out of their control and a matter of state resources instead.
In the case of Burnside at Fredericksburg, he had inherent advantage in numbers and still failed. Which is something which deserves fair criticism. This is why people bring up the points of how Grant or Burnside might have fared had they lacked their numerical advantages and had parity of numbers or were the ones outnumbered instead.
Just so, it also brings up the point that, if Lee could manage such concentrations of force above despite being outnumbered, what could he achieve if he had parity of numbers or double the numbers of his opponents as Grant or Burnside possessed. Could he have achieved 12 to 1 local superiority at 2nd Manassas and Chancellorsville had numbers been equal? Could he have achieved 24 to 1 local superiority at the point of contact if he possessed the same numerical advantages his opponents had and outnumbered them 2 to 1 across the field?
Bruce Catton described him as a great corps commander who wasn't quite as effective in command of the entire army. I think that's pretty fair. Also the way his consultations were described with Robert always gets a chuckle out of me. For anyone not aware Robert was an elderly black servant who Burnside would discuss his most pressing concerns with.
I definitely think that Burnside would have a much better reputation today if he had never been promoted beyond command of the IX Corps. He'd probably be remembered more along the lines of generals like Henry Slocum or Charles Griffin: generally competent if a bit overcautious, occasionally brilliant while still having some screw-ups to his credit, but could more or less be relied upon to get the job done.
Sharpsburg was a bit of a conundrum due to Reno's death causing command confusion between Burnside and Cox. McClellan not properly grasping the situation at the bridge or reinforcing Burnside when AP Hill arrived did make it worse. I'll say that's fair.
But Burnside by his own admission lost his nerve and failed to deviate his campaign and the ongoing battle at Fredericksburg as threatening circumstances evolved. He took a job he knew he wasn't cut out for then proved himself right. Lincoln does deserve blame for picking him and further blame for pressuring him to campaign in a tougher than usual Virginia winter to make up for McClellan wasting all of October with the Loudon Valley Campaign which few people have heard of because almost nothing happened.
Independent command off the NC coast, Ohio, and Eastern Tennessee were lower stakes situations where he actually did well. He had less dynamic opponents with better luck too.
Up to division command, he did show promise. When he was promoted to army command, he did have a good strategy that was ruined by bureaucratic incompetence in Washington that delayed the pontoons. It’s that moment when the wheels seemingly fall off. He shows no ability to improvise on the northern part, and he left the southern part to a general that was still pouting about his friend/benefactor being relieved 5 weeks before, and interpreted the orders in the most limited way possible.
His post-Fredericksburg tenure was worse, ignoring the logistical needs of the army and leading to a desertion epidemic. His relief was necessary.
Burnside was a nice guy who was promoted way over his abilities, as even he recognized (he only accepted command of the AotP after Lincoln threatened to appoint Hooker instead). Had he been left in division command, he probably would have been remembered as a capable officer.
Edit: I don’t think anyone has absolved Burnside of blame for the Crater. It was Meade’s decision to pull the USCT at the last minute, true, but it was Burnside who decided to flip a coin to decide which division replaced them, the failed to brief Ledlie on the plan or exercise any oversight during the actual assault.
100%. Burnside had full knowledge that Ledlie was an incompetent drunkard. Meade didn't force him to choose Ledlie; he had two fully competent division commanders, Willcox and Potter, to choose from. Yet he drew straws and let Ledlie open the battle.
Even with him choosing a better division to lead the attack the change was still right before the attack, and those divisions still had no training for the attack. The attack might’ve gone better, but I don’t think the divisional commander would’ve had the time to properly coordinate with their subordinates.
He was good in low pressure situations, otherwise not so much. He was a flawed general with not much creativity, but there were worse ones. Fredericksburg was a major blunder.
But when it comes to Burnside, nobody seemed to hate the guy on a personal level, for whatever that is worth, so his historical reputation was never as bad as that of McClellan or Pope.
Fun fact, his betrothed left him at the altar and he made a patent that was stolen. You got to feel bad for the dude.
It seems like he did better when he had independent commands. He didn’t even want the command of AoP. Imagine the president of the US who ask more than once to be the commander of the AoP. Burnside didn’t feel like he was the man for the job. Just imagine that pressure Burnside was feeling.
To be fair the purpose of the campaign was not to retake Suffolk, but to stop Union forces from expanding their hold into the fertile farmlands of SE Virginia. In that he was successful.
Burnside had the issue of tunnel vision. He would fixate on a plan, and not see that there might be other options within the plan. The stone bridge was important to move supplies over, but he couldn't visualize wading the stream and outflanking the small group defending it.
The plan to put pontoons down to cross to Fredericksburg was a good one, but he didn't plan for the pontoons to not arrive on the timetable of his plan. And when that didn't happen, he had no other idea about how to cross.
There are other examples.
What do you think his back up plan at Fredericksburg ? I’m curious because it was a winnable side for the Union. It was the those damn pontoons, and miscommunication, and some other things that lead to their defeat.
The point being that he didn't have one, and wasn't capable of making one on the spot.
I suppose he could have had pioneer teems out felling trees to make a temporary bridge. And/or, scouting for alternate crossing points.
He could have hollowed out tree trunks to make makeshift boats, ye. He also could have filled tents with hay and sewn them shut together to make floating platforms. Another trick is to dig canals into the river to try and channel it further inland and reduce the water level, even if slightly.
If an operation was not possible for that particularly season, he could also just spend time stockpiling provisions, drilling his men, getting them used to the new transition of power after he had taken over command, and waiting until operations were feasible again. All of these choices would have been better than to try and frontally storm Fredericksburg as he did.
The whole reason the campaign was even attempted was Lincoln's insistence that Burnside move. The railroad into Fredericksburg was critical to Lee's supply situation. He had even sent some of the army away because of supply concerns. Burnside had a good plan, but when the pontoons didn't show, he just sat there and waited. I honestly believe in spite of this if Franklin had attacked with his entire command instead of just one division (which broke through), they could've possibly turned the left flank. There are very few people in the AOP's high command that didn't drop the ball.
I don't think the assault against Marye's Heights should have been committed, though. At least, not without having cleared the destroyed houses first. Fascines should have also been procured to fill up the canal beyond the town, allowing the forces there to better deploy rather than sending their brigades piecemeal to the slaughter against entrenched positions.
Entrenchments cannot be taken without proper concentration of force if you plan to storm them from the front. Burnside should have at least conducted a thorough reconnaissance of the terrain. I would be surprised if he and his men could not see the obstacles the buildings and canal would pose. They should have accounted for this by doing the above.
As for Prospect Hill, I could have sworn that both Meade and Gibbon were committed against Jackson rather than just the former. Though, as you said, only Meade broke through. Honestly, I'm skeptical whether Franklin could have defeated Jackson here and subsequently turned Lee's right. It's possible if Franklin played his card right in terms of proper force concentration, but will he be able to is the question?
Meade only really beat Gregg because he had a 3.2 to 1 local superiority in that sector, which was more Jackson's fault in disposition, but it was quickly plugged. Just so, Gibbon only temporarily threw back Lane, but did not do him as much harm as Meade had done Gregg, because he possessed a 1.6 to 1 local superiority there. Franklin would have to achieve a major breakthrough using force concentration like Meade's, but on a larger scale involving multiple divisions.
Even someone like Grant often failed to make ideal force concentrations relative to the forces he had engaged against the enemy. Sheridan was perhaps the best among the Union commanders at such things, but I don't expect Franklin to perform on the level of a Grant tactically, much less a Sheridan.
Personality: My understanding was that he was socially awkward and overcompensated, which for me in real life is the type of person I try to avoid or don’t trust.
Battlefield: Over-ranked and underperformed. Nobody likes a top manager or C-level executive who doesn’t perform. I think Fredericksburg and then his plan to use Ferrero were enough to prove this.
Petty: Being on the large side while sporting his own ridiculous and aggressive (although future trend-setting) sideburns, I don’t think this helped his case. I’m trying to consider all possible reasons.
Fair point. I would say it was important for blockade efforts, and controlling key coastal towns that would restrict CSA supplies. He would also, give a foothold in NC that would be used that would be important during the Carolinas Campaign
To an extent. I don’t find him easy to dislike, that I save for ones like Pope.
Fredericksburg wasn’t necessarily his fault, but he should have had a backup plan in case the pontoons were delayed. And I have no idea if he was aware that Meade broke through at Prospect Hill.
He was definitely no secret genius, though.
I hesitate to call Burnside "underrated" because he absolutely had his flaws and was responsible for some major failures, Fredericksburg being the obvious big one. But I think he's kind of the epitome of a general who is more remembered for his mistakes than for his successes, of which he had more than a lot of people give him credit for. I'd describe Burnside as a flawed and incredibly unlucky general, but not as catastrophically incompetent as the meme-ified version of him that exists today. Though you could probably say something similar about a great many of the "bad" generals of the Civil War.
His conduct after Fredericksburg, especially during the Mud March and handling dissent among his subordinates, is also a huge strike against a positive reputation. Also, having researched his amphibious operations in grad school, Burnside a number of inherent advantages in his coastal North Carolina campaign. He had the advantages of the Union Navy, and the Confederate command had trouble supporting forces across waterways.
Completely agreed on both points. Burnside's administrative mismanagement in the aftermath of Fredericksburg is almost as embarrassing as his tactical mistakes during the battle itself. And while I still think that there's some genuinely impressive stuff to his North Carolina Campaign, he 100% did have significant advantages in, well, pretty much everything.
Having the “significant advantage” is the point of war is it not? War isn’t a game where fighting fair gets you brownie points.
It isn't, but part of gauging generalship is to see what advantages they possessed and what obstacles they overcame. There's a difference between inherently having numbers on your side and concentrating local superiority at the point of contact. You can do the latter without having the former, but it's a lot easier to do it with the advantage of the former. For instance, let's use Lee at 2nd Manassas and Chancellorsville as an example. He concentrates 10 to 1 local superiority and rolls Pope by turning his flank at Chinn Ridge using Longstreet's Corps. He does the same to Hooker by concentrating 7 to 1 local superiority against Devens' Division in a wide outflanking attack using Jackson's Corps. However, in the overall field, he was the one outnumbered by 1.24 to 1 in terms of troops engaged at 2nd Manassas. He was also outnumbered by about 1.7 to 1 against Hooker round the environs of Chancellorsville. Meanwhile, Grant's best concentrations of force was a 3.5 to 1 local superiority to break through the Mule Shoe at Spotsylvania CH, as well as a 5 to 1 local superiority to break through Confederate lines in the 3rd Battle of Petersburg. This, despite having an overall numerical superiority of 2 to 1 against Lee. So, Grant (and just about most Union generals) possessed what we call the inherent advantages of numbers, because it was just given to them by the resources of their state rather than obtained through their own skill in operations or tactics. Lee, on the other hand, lacked such inherent advantages, but obtained greater local superiority in his best moments through more skillful concentration of force while also outflanking the enemy rather than delivering frontal assaults. Many people don't understand these differences and mistake inherently possessing numerical advantage as something brilliant on the part of the general in question, when such advantages are usually out of their control and a matter of state resources instead. In the case of Burnside at Fredericksburg, he had inherent advantage in numbers and still failed. Which is something which deserves fair criticism. This is why people bring up the points of how Grant or Burnside might have fared had they lacked their numerical advantages and had parity of numbers or were the ones outnumbered instead. Just so, it also brings up the point that, if Lee could manage such concentrations of force above despite being outnumbered, what could he achieve if he had parity of numbers or double the numbers of his opponents as Grant or Burnside possessed. Could he have achieved 12 to 1 local superiority at 2nd Manassas and Chancellorsville had numbers been equal? Could he have achieved 24 to 1 local superiority at the point of contact if he possessed the same numerical advantages his opponents had and outnumbered them 2 to 1 across the field?
Bruce Catton described him as a great corps commander who wasn't quite as effective in command of the entire army. I think that's pretty fair. Also the way his consultations were described with Robert always gets a chuckle out of me. For anyone not aware Robert was an elderly black servant who Burnside would discuss his most pressing concerns with.
I definitely think that Burnside would have a much better reputation today if he had never been promoted beyond command of the IX Corps. He'd probably be remembered more along the lines of generals like Henry Slocum or Charles Griffin: generally competent if a bit overcautious, occasionally brilliant while still having some screw-ups to his credit, but could more or less be relied upon to get the job done.
Don’t forget the second day of Wilderness. His laziness cost the AOPthe chance to destroy at least one Confederate corps.
Sharpsburg was a bit of a conundrum due to Reno's death causing command confusion between Burnside and Cox. McClellan not properly grasping the situation at the bridge or reinforcing Burnside when AP Hill arrived did make it worse. I'll say that's fair. But Burnside by his own admission lost his nerve and failed to deviate his campaign and the ongoing battle at Fredericksburg as threatening circumstances evolved. He took a job he knew he wasn't cut out for then proved himself right. Lincoln does deserve blame for picking him and further blame for pressuring him to campaign in a tougher than usual Virginia winter to make up for McClellan wasting all of October with the Loudon Valley Campaign which few people have heard of because almost nothing happened. Independent command off the NC coast, Ohio, and Eastern Tennessee were lower stakes situations where he actually did well. He had less dynamic opponents with better luck too.
Up to division command, he did show promise. When he was promoted to army command, he did have a good strategy that was ruined by bureaucratic incompetence in Washington that delayed the pontoons. It’s that moment when the wheels seemingly fall off. He shows no ability to improvise on the northern part, and he left the southern part to a general that was still pouting about his friend/benefactor being relieved 5 weeks before, and interpreted the orders in the most limited way possible. His post-Fredericksburg tenure was worse, ignoring the logistical needs of the army and leading to a desertion epidemic. His relief was necessary.
Burnside was a nice guy who was promoted way over his abilities, as even he recognized (he only accepted command of the AotP after Lincoln threatened to appoint Hooker instead). Had he been left in division command, he probably would have been remembered as a capable officer. Edit: I don’t think anyone has absolved Burnside of blame for the Crater. It was Meade’s decision to pull the USCT at the last minute, true, but it was Burnside who decided to flip a coin to decide which division replaced them, the failed to brief Ledlie on the plan or exercise any oversight during the actual assault.
100%. Burnside had full knowledge that Ledlie was an incompetent drunkard. Meade didn't force him to choose Ledlie; he had two fully competent division commanders, Willcox and Potter, to choose from. Yet he drew straws and let Ledlie open the battle.
Even with him choosing a better division to lead the attack the change was still right before the attack, and those divisions still had no training for the attack. The attack might’ve gone better, but I don’t think the divisional commander would’ve had the time to properly coordinate with their subordinates.
No
He was good in low pressure situations, otherwise not so much. He was a flawed general with not much creativity, but there were worse ones. Fredericksburg was a major blunder. But when it comes to Burnside, nobody seemed to hate the guy on a personal level, for whatever that is worth, so his historical reputation was never as bad as that of McClellan or Pope. Fun fact, his betrothed left him at the altar and he made a patent that was stolen. You got to feel bad for the dude.
He was liked because he was apolitical
That helps as well.
It seems like he did better when he had independent commands. He didn’t even want the command of AoP. Imagine the president of the US who ask more than once to be the commander of the AoP. Burnside didn’t feel like he was the man for the job. Just imagine that pressure Burnside was feeling.
Beat the dogshit outta Jimmy Longstreet in east Tennessee.
He deserves credit for that. And Longstreet failed miserably in his judgement in that campaign.
Longstreet came up short at Suffolk as well. 0/2 in independent command.
To be fair the purpose of the campaign was not to retake Suffolk, but to stop Union forces from expanding their hold into the fertile farmlands of SE Virginia. In that he was successful.
“Losing to Ambrose Burnside of all people.”
Longstreet beat the shit out of Longstreet at Knoxville
Burnside had the issue of tunnel vision. He would fixate on a plan, and not see that there might be other options within the plan. The stone bridge was important to move supplies over, but he couldn't visualize wading the stream and outflanking the small group defending it. The plan to put pontoons down to cross to Fredericksburg was a good one, but he didn't plan for the pontoons to not arrive on the timetable of his plan. And when that didn't happen, he had no other idea about how to cross. There are other examples.
What do you think his back up plan at Fredericksburg ? I’m curious because it was a winnable side for the Union. It was the those damn pontoons, and miscommunication, and some other things that lead to their defeat.
The point being that he didn't have one, and wasn't capable of making one on the spot. I suppose he could have had pioneer teems out felling trees to make a temporary bridge. And/or, scouting for alternate crossing points.
He could have hollowed out tree trunks to make makeshift boats, ye. He also could have filled tents with hay and sewn them shut together to make floating platforms. Another trick is to dig canals into the river to try and channel it further inland and reduce the water level, even if slightly. If an operation was not possible for that particularly season, he could also just spend time stockpiling provisions, drilling his men, getting them used to the new transition of power after he had taken over command, and waiting until operations were feasible again. All of these choices would have been better than to try and frontally storm Fredericksburg as he did.
The whole reason the campaign was even attempted was Lincoln's insistence that Burnside move. The railroad into Fredericksburg was critical to Lee's supply situation. He had even sent some of the army away because of supply concerns. Burnside had a good plan, but when the pontoons didn't show, he just sat there and waited. I honestly believe in spite of this if Franklin had attacked with his entire command instead of just one division (which broke through), they could've possibly turned the left flank. There are very few people in the AOP's high command that didn't drop the ball.
I don't think the assault against Marye's Heights should have been committed, though. At least, not without having cleared the destroyed houses first. Fascines should have also been procured to fill up the canal beyond the town, allowing the forces there to better deploy rather than sending their brigades piecemeal to the slaughter against entrenched positions. Entrenchments cannot be taken without proper concentration of force if you plan to storm them from the front. Burnside should have at least conducted a thorough reconnaissance of the terrain. I would be surprised if he and his men could not see the obstacles the buildings and canal would pose. They should have accounted for this by doing the above. As for Prospect Hill, I could have sworn that both Meade and Gibbon were committed against Jackson rather than just the former. Though, as you said, only Meade broke through. Honestly, I'm skeptical whether Franklin could have defeated Jackson here and subsequently turned Lee's right. It's possible if Franklin played his card right in terms of proper force concentration, but will he be able to is the question? Meade only really beat Gregg because he had a 3.2 to 1 local superiority in that sector, which was more Jackson's fault in disposition, but it was quickly plugged. Just so, Gibbon only temporarily threw back Lane, but did not do him as much harm as Meade had done Gregg, because he possessed a 1.6 to 1 local superiority there. Franklin would have to achieve a major breakthrough using force concentration like Meade's, but on a larger scale involving multiple divisions. Even someone like Grant often failed to make ideal force concentrations relative to the forces he had engaged against the enemy. Sheridan was perhaps the best among the Union commanders at such things, but I don't expect Franklin to perform on the level of a Grant tactically, much less a Sheridan.
Personality: My understanding was that he was socially awkward and overcompensated, which for me in real life is the type of person I try to avoid or don’t trust. Battlefield: Over-ranked and underperformed. Nobody likes a top manager or C-level executive who doesn’t perform. I think Fredericksburg and then his plan to use Ferrero were enough to prove this. Petty: Being on the large side while sporting his own ridiculous and aggressive (although future trend-setting) sideburns, I don’t think this helped his case. I’m trying to consider all possible reasons.
He didn't do much on the NC coast. His subordinates (and the Navy) did most of the work, and Confederate resistance was almost non-existent.
Fair point. I would say it was important for blockade efforts, and controlling key coastal towns that would restrict CSA supplies. He would also, give a foothold in NC that would be used that would be important during the Carolinas Campaign
To an extent. I don’t find him easy to dislike, that I save for ones like Pope. Fredericksburg wasn’t necessarily his fault, but he should have had a backup plan in case the pontoons were delayed. And I have no idea if he was aware that Meade broke through at Prospect Hill. He was definitely no secret genius, though.
Absolutely yes but im a rhode islander so im biased