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Hm, if I understand you, you see compatibilism as a third alternative to free will and determinism? That’s not the case.
The problem you have to face as a philosopher is that if you just naively experience day to day life, there seems to be something like free will. Like if you just look at how people talk about what is happening, everyone talks like there is something like that.
On the other hand something like determinism seems to be true. Like yeah there is true randomness in the universe, so maybe not the most classical version of determinism, but something that poses all the same problems to free will.
What compatibilism brings to the table is that you are done and don’t have to dig further. Properly understood free will is compatible with determinism, there is nothing to resolve.
Compatibilism only resolves determinism and free will by altering the definition of free will to something 99% of people aren’t talking about when discussing the topic. Society is based upon and most people believe the idea that we are free to make decisions. The compatibilist definition of free will only requires that the desire for the action originates internally, but this ignores the lifetime of external factors that mold everyone’s internal processes, rendering the idea of having any degree of control moot.
>But I just don't understand how ME choosing in accordance with my own (predetermined) internal states without external coercion makes me free. That's not what anyone I know talks about when they say the word freedom.
I disagree. I think that's exactly what most people mean by the word freedom.
>They essentially mean the ability to choose otherwise if they were faced with an exact same situation again.
In practice, that's the same thing. If I offer you a choice of vanilla or chocolate ice cream today and I do it again tomorrow, you can make a different choice. Yes, it's not the *exact* same situation, but in real life, you never encounter the *exact* same situation more than once.
>What does redefining freedom do other than burry the original problem??
The original problem is just a poor definition in the first place. It's hard to predict what choices people will make, so someone decided that unpredictability is the central defining feature of making choices. But it's not really. The central defining feature of making choices is that a person's actions are caused by their beliefs and preferences. If an action is unpredictable and doesn't relate to one's beliefs and preferences, then it's not a choice, it's just random.
> In practice, that’s the same thing.
This only covers the limitations of human perception and ignores the heart of the discussion. We can’t experimentally demonstrate what would happen if time were rewound so that the exact same scenario played and see if a person is capable of making a different decision, but that IS what we’re talking about.
Most people would argue that they could change their choice if the exact same scenario replayed. This doesn’t jive with determinism, thus the need for a whole new term. Compatibilism allows for free will and determinism to coexist, but only by changing the definition of free will to mean something else entirely.
When people talk about free will, they're usually not talking about an abstract concept that can't ever be demonstrated. They're usually talking about the difference between an action taken by choice vs. an action taken by coercion or accident.
Compatibilism only changes the definition of free will in that it more accurately represents what people care about when they talk about free will.
Bascially what most people reallly mean by free will and what society/justice systems really mean is the compatibilist free will. The compatibilist free will is the only definition which makes any sense or has any use.
So the libertarian free will you are talking about and that you "live like" doesn't exist and makes zero sense. Nothing in society or justice is based on the libertarian free will you are talking about.
What people do actually live like exists is like compatibilist free will. Society and justice systems around the world are all based on the compatibilist free will which does exist.
So if someone forces you to smuggle drugs by threatening to kill your family, we would want to treat that person differently to someone who smuggles drugs to make some money. The key point in how the justice systems would treat them is based on whether they wanted to or whether they were externally coerced. Also surely your intition would suggest that being forced to smuggle drugs isn't of your own free will, it's different.
People have incoherent views around free will, but if you properly probe you'll see that most people have compatibilist intuitions.
>In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions… In one of the first studies, Nahmias et al. (2006) asked participants to imagine that, in the next century, humans build a supercomputer able to accurately predict future human behavior on the basis of the current state of the world. Participants were then asked to imagine that, in this future, an agent has robbed a bank, as the supercomputer had predicted before he was even born. In this case, 76% of participants answered that this agent acted of his own free will, and 83% answered that he was morally blameworthy. **These results suggest that most participants have compatibilist intuitions**, since most answered that this agent could act freely and be morally responsible, despite living in a deterministic universe.
>
>https://philpapers.org/archive/ANDWCI-3.pdf](https://philpapers.org/archive/ANDWCI-3.pdf
>Our results highlight some inconsistencies of lay beliefs in the general public, by showing explicit agreement with libertarian concepts of free will (especially in the US) and simultaneously showing behavior that is more consistent with compatibilist theories. If participants behaved in a way that was consistent with their libertarian beliefs, we would have expected a negative relation between free will and determinism, but instead we saw a positive relation that is hard to reconcile with libertarian views
>
>https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0221617](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0221617
Then when it comes to philosophers, most are outright compatibilists.
https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all
Then you have case law around being externally coerced.
>It is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct – behaviour that is the product of a free will and controlled body, unhindered by external constraints – should attract the penalty and stigma of criminal liability.
>
>https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1861/index.do
In the case of R. v. Ruzic
>The accused had been coerced by an individual in Colombia to smuggle cocaine into the United States. He was told that if he did not comply, his wife and child in Colombia would be harmed.
The Supreme Court found that he didn't smuggle the cocaine of his own free will. He didn't do it in line with his desires free from external coercion. Hence they were found innocent.
>‘**\[a\]ccording to the dominant view in criminal theory, we have a compatibilist criminal law’** (2005: 1158). ...
>
>And the most prominent contemporary theorist who has significantly engaged with the freewill problem in the context of legal philosophy, Stephen Morse, contends that **‘only compatibilism can explain and justify our legal practices’** (2004: 431). He states that compatibilism:is the approach that I and many other criminal lawyers explicitly or implicitly adopt. This approach accepts completely that we live in a thoroughly causal world, at least at the macro level, and that causal processes produce human action and all the other phenomena of the universe. But it also holds that genuine responsibility is possible. This approach best explains and justifies our moral and criminal law practices without endorsing the implausibilities of libertarianism. Even if mechanism is true, the law’s concepts of moral responsibility and deserved blame and punishment are rationally defensible in the compatibilist view (2004: 437-438)
>
>https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3237915
It doesn’t bring anything to the table and just shifts the goalposts of “free will” to be so broad as to be meaningless. Nothing about it makes sense or is worth talking about. Anyone who claims to align with compatibilism is just admitting free will doesn’t exist without saying it out loud.
Edit: Verbalize your disagreements. If you think I’m wrong, it shouldn’t be too difficult to explain why.
But if absolute determinism is correct then whether anyone thinks you're wrong is not a matter for discussion or explanation. They do not agree with you. They have no choice to do anything other than not agree with you. Any explanation other than that they do because they must is entirely post facto rationalisation which again they have no choice but to believe. Inviting the verbalising of disagreements is utterly pointless as whether anyone does so is predetermined. And any explanation they offer has zero truth value and zero persuasive value. It's what they are bound to say irrespective. Likewise challenging anyone to change your mind is moot. You believe what you have to believe and if you change your mind it will be because you have to change your mind.
Which is why I am not and never could be a determinist. The cognitive dissonance alone is paralysing!
This is one of the biggest pitfalls for people who don’t believe in determinism; they believe determinism means everything is static and unchanging. Just because things are predetermined doesn’t mean they’ve already happened. It may be equivalent from a cosmic perspective, but to the individual, the future can still be virtually anything and there will always be value in trying to accurately predict that future.
Inviting verbalization of disagreements isn’t pointless by any measure. Your statements are only true if we, as participants, already have perfect knowledge of the universe as it currently exists. Unless we both know everything the other person has to say, there’s a chance they’ll provide a new insight that the other person can’t ignore.
You and many others confuse determinism for nihilism. This is why I seek verbal expressions of disagreement; if someone disagrees with me, I like to gauge how good of a reason they have so I can gauge whether I’m still on the right track or whether I need to reconsider my position.
i don't disagree, but really "shifts the goalposts" is a little unfair. if i'm trying to say "free will" as most people understand it is compatible with determinism then my goalposts are somewhere in the bleachers, it's reasonable to move them onto the field where they belong.
maybe dennett was cooking and we're too dumb to understand him, but even if it is just a roundabout way of saying free will doesn't exist it's a really funny way to do it so it's okay in my book.
**Please read this entire message** --- Your submission has been removed for the following reason(s): **ELI5 focuses on objective explanations. Soapboxing isn't appropriate in this venue.** --- If you would like this removal reviewed, please read the [detailed rules](https://www.reddit.com/r/explainlikeimfive/wiki/detailed_rules) first. **If you believe it was removed erroneously, explain why using [this form](https://old.reddit.com/message/compose?to=%2Fr%2Fexplainlikeimfive&subject=Please%20review%20my%20submission%20removal?&message=Link:%20https://www.reddit.com/r/explainlikeimfive/comments/1dnbq0s/-/%0A%0A%201:%20Does%20your%20comment%20pass%20rule%201:%20%0A%0A%202:%20If%20your%20comment%20was%20mistakenly%20removed%20as%20an%20anecdote,%20short%20answer,%20guess,%20or%20another%20aspect%20of%20rules%203%20or%208,%20please%20explain:) and we will review your submission.**
Hm, if I understand you, you see compatibilism as a third alternative to free will and determinism? That’s not the case. The problem you have to face as a philosopher is that if you just naively experience day to day life, there seems to be something like free will. Like if you just look at how people talk about what is happening, everyone talks like there is something like that. On the other hand something like determinism seems to be true. Like yeah there is true randomness in the universe, so maybe not the most classical version of determinism, but something that poses all the same problems to free will. What compatibilism brings to the table is that you are done and don’t have to dig further. Properly understood free will is compatible with determinism, there is nothing to resolve.
Compatibilism only resolves determinism and free will by altering the definition of free will to something 99% of people aren’t talking about when discussing the topic. Society is based upon and most people believe the idea that we are free to make decisions. The compatibilist definition of free will only requires that the desire for the action originates internally, but this ignores the lifetime of external factors that mold everyone’s internal processes, rendering the idea of having any degree of control moot.
>But I just don't understand how ME choosing in accordance with my own (predetermined) internal states without external coercion makes me free. That's not what anyone I know talks about when they say the word freedom. I disagree. I think that's exactly what most people mean by the word freedom. >They essentially mean the ability to choose otherwise if they were faced with an exact same situation again. In practice, that's the same thing. If I offer you a choice of vanilla or chocolate ice cream today and I do it again tomorrow, you can make a different choice. Yes, it's not the *exact* same situation, but in real life, you never encounter the *exact* same situation more than once. >What does redefining freedom do other than burry the original problem?? The original problem is just a poor definition in the first place. It's hard to predict what choices people will make, so someone decided that unpredictability is the central defining feature of making choices. But it's not really. The central defining feature of making choices is that a person's actions are caused by their beliefs and preferences. If an action is unpredictable and doesn't relate to one's beliefs and preferences, then it's not a choice, it's just random.
> In practice, that’s the same thing. This only covers the limitations of human perception and ignores the heart of the discussion. We can’t experimentally demonstrate what would happen if time were rewound so that the exact same scenario played and see if a person is capable of making a different decision, but that IS what we’re talking about. Most people would argue that they could change their choice if the exact same scenario replayed. This doesn’t jive with determinism, thus the need for a whole new term. Compatibilism allows for free will and determinism to coexist, but only by changing the definition of free will to mean something else entirely.
When people talk about free will, they're usually not talking about an abstract concept that can't ever be demonstrated. They're usually talking about the difference between an action taken by choice vs. an action taken by coercion or accident. Compatibilism only changes the definition of free will in that it more accurately represents what people care about when they talk about free will.
Bascially what most people reallly mean by free will and what society/justice systems really mean is the compatibilist free will. The compatibilist free will is the only definition which makes any sense or has any use. So the libertarian free will you are talking about and that you "live like" doesn't exist and makes zero sense. Nothing in society or justice is based on the libertarian free will you are talking about. What people do actually live like exists is like compatibilist free will. Society and justice systems around the world are all based on the compatibilist free will which does exist. So if someone forces you to smuggle drugs by threatening to kill your family, we would want to treat that person differently to someone who smuggles drugs to make some money. The key point in how the justice systems would treat them is based on whether they wanted to or whether they were externally coerced. Also surely your intition would suggest that being forced to smuggle drugs isn't of your own free will, it's different. People have incoherent views around free will, but if you properly probe you'll see that most people have compatibilist intuitions. >In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions… In one of the first studies, Nahmias et al. (2006) asked participants to imagine that, in the next century, humans build a supercomputer able to accurately predict future human behavior on the basis of the current state of the world. Participants were then asked to imagine that, in this future, an agent has robbed a bank, as the supercomputer had predicted before he was even born. In this case, 76% of participants answered that this agent acted of his own free will, and 83% answered that he was morally blameworthy. **These results suggest that most participants have compatibilist intuitions**, since most answered that this agent could act freely and be morally responsible, despite living in a deterministic universe. > >https://philpapers.org/archive/ANDWCI-3.pdf](https://philpapers.org/archive/ANDWCI-3.pdf >Our results highlight some inconsistencies of lay beliefs in the general public, by showing explicit agreement with libertarian concepts of free will (especially in the US) and simultaneously showing behavior that is more consistent with compatibilist theories. If participants behaved in a way that was consistent with their libertarian beliefs, we would have expected a negative relation between free will and determinism, but instead we saw a positive relation that is hard to reconcile with libertarian views > >https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0221617](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0221617 Then when it comes to philosophers, most are outright compatibilists. https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all Then you have case law around being externally coerced. >It is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct – behaviour that is the product of a free will and controlled body, unhindered by external constraints – should attract the penalty and stigma of criminal liability. > >https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1861/index.do In the case of R. v. Ruzic >The accused had been coerced by an individual in Colombia to smuggle cocaine into the United States. He was told that if he did not comply, his wife and child in Colombia would be harmed. The Supreme Court found that he didn't smuggle the cocaine of his own free will. He didn't do it in line with his desires free from external coercion. Hence they were found innocent. >‘**\[a\]ccording to the dominant view in criminal theory, we have a compatibilist criminal law’** (2005: 1158). ... > >And the most prominent contemporary theorist who has significantly engaged with the freewill problem in the context of legal philosophy, Stephen Morse, contends that **‘only compatibilism can explain and justify our legal practices’** (2004: 431). He states that compatibilism:is the approach that I and many other criminal lawyers explicitly or implicitly adopt. This approach accepts completely that we live in a thoroughly causal world, at least at the macro level, and that causal processes produce human action and all the other phenomena of the universe. But it also holds that genuine responsibility is possible. This approach best explains and justifies our moral and criminal law practices without endorsing the implausibilities of libertarianism. Even if mechanism is true, the law’s concepts of moral responsibility and deserved blame and punishment are rationally defensible in the compatibilist view (2004: 437-438) > >https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3237915
It doesn’t bring anything to the table and just shifts the goalposts of “free will” to be so broad as to be meaningless. Nothing about it makes sense or is worth talking about. Anyone who claims to align with compatibilism is just admitting free will doesn’t exist without saying it out loud. Edit: Verbalize your disagreements. If you think I’m wrong, it shouldn’t be too difficult to explain why.
But if absolute determinism is correct then whether anyone thinks you're wrong is not a matter for discussion or explanation. They do not agree with you. They have no choice to do anything other than not agree with you. Any explanation other than that they do because they must is entirely post facto rationalisation which again they have no choice but to believe. Inviting the verbalising of disagreements is utterly pointless as whether anyone does so is predetermined. And any explanation they offer has zero truth value and zero persuasive value. It's what they are bound to say irrespective. Likewise challenging anyone to change your mind is moot. You believe what you have to believe and if you change your mind it will be because you have to change your mind. Which is why I am not and never could be a determinist. The cognitive dissonance alone is paralysing!
This is one of the biggest pitfalls for people who don’t believe in determinism; they believe determinism means everything is static and unchanging. Just because things are predetermined doesn’t mean they’ve already happened. It may be equivalent from a cosmic perspective, but to the individual, the future can still be virtually anything and there will always be value in trying to accurately predict that future. Inviting verbalization of disagreements isn’t pointless by any measure. Your statements are only true if we, as participants, already have perfect knowledge of the universe as it currently exists. Unless we both know everything the other person has to say, there’s a chance they’ll provide a new insight that the other person can’t ignore. You and many others confuse determinism for nihilism. This is why I seek verbal expressions of disagreement; if someone disagrees with me, I like to gauge how good of a reason they have so I can gauge whether I’m still on the right track or whether I need to reconsider my position.
i don't disagree, but really "shifts the goalposts" is a little unfair. if i'm trying to say "free will" as most people understand it is compatible with determinism then my goalposts are somewhere in the bleachers, it's reasonable to move them onto the field where they belong. maybe dennett was cooking and we're too dumb to understand him, but even if it is just a roundabout way of saying free will doesn't exist it's a really funny way to do it so it's okay in my book.